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previous despatches. On the same subject, I have now the honour to transmit the enclosed letter containing many interesting details, from the Special Correspondent in Tonquin of the leading journal of Hong Kong.
I have the honour to be, My Lord, Your Lordship's most obedient, humble Servant.
H.Bowen
Enclosure
THE WAR IN TONQUIN.
THE HUNG-HOA FIASCO. [FROM OUR SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT.]
HUNG-HOA, 17th April, 1884.
There were some awkward quarters of an hour in the month of December that decided the issue of the present French campaign in Tonquin. If, when between three and four o'clock on the afternoon of the 14th December, the Chinese commenced their grand turning movement from the East gate of the outer line of fortifications at Sontay, they had displayed a little more determination, Bacninh would probably not now be in French hands and Hung-Hoa almost certainly would not.
The flank movement was almost successful. But just when the Frenchmen seemed hemmed in between the lines of Phuc-sa and the river, the Chinamen faltered and broke. They were Yunnan mountaineers and fought well, but they wanted the grit of the Black Flags, and the Black Flags were all in the forts and earthworks of Phuc-sa.
An hour later the tricolour floated over Phuc-sa. During that night, however, fortune again wavered in the balance. The Black Flags drove the Turcos from their position and were within five yards of the earthworks when the Algerians were placed by the Colonial Infantry. Both sides fired at the flash of the enemy's guns, and the Chinamen gained a slight advantage by throwing fire-sticks.
But just when the French were worn out with fourteen hours' incessant fighting, the Black Flag bugles sounded the "cease fire" (identical with the French call) and they retired at five in the morning.
Next day, the 15th, a fatal error was made in failing to resist the deploying of the French troops along the embankment which formed the works of Phuc-sa. When that movement westward was completed late in the afternoon, Sontay was lost and the fighting in Tonquin was practically over.
You will ask what all this has to do with Hung-Hoa. It has nothing to do with Hung-Hoa, but there is nothing much to say about that place, and the talk round the bivouac fires was all about Sontay.
There can be little doubt that the French looked forward to the attack on Hung-Hoa with some degree of anxiety, one might even say, apprehension. The citadel itself was nothing, like other citadels of Tonquin. Indeed, it was more feeble than the others, for it was within two hundred yards of the river.
But the gunboats could not mount to attack it, for there was not enough water, and the outworks were known to be very strong. Moreover, it was supposed that Liu Jung-fu would make a desperate stand here, on the verge of the forest and hill country, the last of any account on the Song-coi below Lao-kai.
Further, it was reported a month ago that the warlike Governor of Yunnan had come south with six thousand men and was going to check the French invaders.
But the earthworks had no cannon mounted in them, Liu Jung-fu was away in the hills between Tuyen-kwan and Thai-nguyen, waiting for the money which China neglects to send him—solicitations no doubt to pay the indemnity which France demands.
The Governor of Yunnan, instead of marching with six thousand men to the defence of Hung-Hoa, would appear to have marched all alone over to the majority, and the six thousand men were no doubt fully employed at his funeral.
But perhaps it would be as well to give something like a connected account of the operations.
There was a plan of operations. There was also a plan for the confusion of the Chinamen at Bacninh. Négrier was to do the cutting off there. He was not successful, mainly because it was impossible, certainly impossible when the other forces did not march in unison.
Accordingly, Brière de l'Isle was deputed to cut off the retreat this time. He was to march up to Bat-Bac, a village which the perversity of map drawers places half a dozen miles inland, but which is really hard up against the banks of the Rivière Noire.
There he was to cross the river, march by a hill track, and take the Chinamen in the rear. Négrier was to march up to the confluence of the Rivière Noire with the Fleuve Rouge. There he was to cross and march straight on the town, detaching a battalion of infantry, all the cavalry, and a battery of artillery, which was to cross the Song-coi and seize the north end of the bridge which the Chinamen had constructed.
Thus there was to be no route left open for the garrison to retreat by except the road to Lao-kai, and they were to be very severely pounded before they made their escape that way.
General Brière de l'Isle with four thousand men left Hanoi on the 5th April to march overland to Sontay and thence to Bat-Bac. General Négrier followed him the next day, and true to his name of Mao-lem, which the soldiers have given him, finished the march to Sontay, which had taken Brière's column the best part of three days, by mid-day on the second.
Mao-lem means "hurry up" or "be quick" and is the uniform cry of the soldiers who guard the baggage train. The convoy of each column numbers about a thousand coolies and extends over a matter of a mile in length on Tonquin roads, so that the refrain becomes sufficiently monotonous.
The General cries "en avant," the officers ejaculate "sorrez," and the baggage guard echoes "Mao-lem." That is the supposed train of thought.
It is enough, however, without being so logical, to say that Négrier always makes heavy marches, that he hurries from one end of the column (6,000 yards long) to the other, all through the day, and at the end of the march, when everybody else is content to rest tranquilly in his billet, goes out prospecting the surrounding country.
Well may the French hope for much from his energy and look upon him as the "coming general." Coming for what, all the world knows.
Négrier's big march did not, however, conduce to the comfort of the troops. Nobody in Sontay expected him, and there was no room for his troops, so he had to stay outside, and the wretched villagers who had "the Legion" and the plundering baggage coolies settled in their midst, had still more solid reasons for regret.
However, next day Brière went off to Bat-Bac and reached there in two days, and on the afternoon of his entry Négrier was joined by the Commander-in-Chief, the Grand Buddha, as the Annamese call him.
A march was made up the embankment following the river the next day, and the troops cantoned within three miles of the Black River.
There they had to wait a day for the heavy guns; the "pieces of 80" and of "95" had been embarked in junks and they all got aground with one accord across the mouth of the Rivière Claire.
They were got off and towed up a mile or two and then got aground again, and finally the men had to be disembarked and taken overland.
All this took time, and it was in the grey light of a rainy Good Friday morning that the troops arrived at the mouth of the Black River.
Brière de l'Isle had extended his line down the right of the river from Bat-Bac so as to keep in touch with the second column. He had done more. He had established a battery of "pièces de quatre-vingt" the day before on a hillock close to the river and had pitched shells into Hung-Hoa from a distance of 6,000 yards.
This was denounced by everyone as premature and as a blunder. But there were more mistakes coming.
In the meantime, we were somewhat astonished to find a little post of Chinamen established in a small entrenched barricade right opposite us.
There was a sentinel marching up and down in full view, and every now and then a man would walk out onto the bank and have a shot at us.
The river itself was about 350 yards in width, but there were broad sandbanks on either side, and we were on a high bank. We therefore looked on tranquilly.
Presently, however, an unlucky Turco got his left shoulder smashed with a bullet, and then a few volleys of companies were despatched to make the Celestials quit.
This they did without either delay or loss. Meanwhile, some junks designed to make a bridge and conveying ammunition and stores came up the Red River.
A hundred or so of Annamese and Chinese mixed thereupon came down the left bank of the Song-coi and commenced rifle fire at about 1,300 yards or so.
Finding this ineffectual, they got out a gingal, but had only fired three shots when the Eclair came up and sent them to the right about with some rounds from her Hotchkiss guns.
Meanwhile, the big guns were getting into position on a little pine-crowned hillock behind the village of Truong-Ba, where we had halted.
Between eight and nine o'clock they commenced their fire. There was a battery of "pieces of eighty"—ordinary European horse artillery—and a battery of "siege guns"—"pieces of ninety-five," the regular field artillery of...
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0.
43-
10170
previous despatches. bject, I have
on the same.
now the honour to
travomit the enclored letter containing
many
interesting details, from the Special Correspondent in
احة في العالم
Tonquin
of the leading journal of Hong Kong. Shave the honour to be,
My Lord, Your Lordship's most obedient,
Ituble Servant.
5.Bowen
Enclosur
Enclosure
THE WAR IN TONQUIN.
THE HUNG-HOA FIASCO. [FROM OUR SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT.]
HUNG-HOA, 17th April, 1884. There wore some awkward quarters of an hour in the month of December that decided the issue of the present French campaign in Touquin. If. when between three and four o'clock on the afternoon of the 14th December, the Chinese commonced their grand turning movement from the East gute of the outer line of fortifications
at Sontay they had displayed a little more deter- mination. Bacninh would probably not now be in French hands and Hung-Hos almost cer- tainly would not. The flunk movement was almost sneessful. But just when the Frenchmen seemed hemmed in between the lines of Phuc-sa and the river, the Chinamen faltered and broke, They were Yunnan mountaineers and fought well, but they wanted the grit of the Black Flags, and the Black Flags were all in the forts and earthworks of 'huc-sa. An hour later the tricolour floated over Phuc-sa. During that night, however, fortaue again wavered in the balance. The Black Flags drove the Turcos from their position and were within five yards of the earthworks when the Algerians were placed by the Colonial Infantry. Both sides Ared at the flash of the enemy's guns, and the Chinamen gained a slight advantage by throwing fire-sticks. But just when the French were worn out with fourteen hours' incessant fighting, the Black Flag horas sounded the "cease fire' (identical with the French call) and they retired at five in the morning. Next day, the 15th, a fatal error was made in failing to resist the deploying of the French troops along the embankment which formed the works of Phuc-sa. When that movement westward was completed late in the afternoon, Sontay was lost and the tighting in Toaquin was practically over.
YA-
You will ask what all this has to do with Hung-Hoa. It has nothing to do with Hung- Hoa, but there is nothing much to say about that place, and the talk round the bivouac fires was all about Sontay. There can be little doubt that the French looked forward to the attack on Hung-Hoa with some degree of anxiety, one taight even say, apprehension. The citadel itself * was nothing, like other citadels of Tov- quin Indeed it was more foeble than the others, for it was within two hundred yards of the river. But the ganboats could not mount to attack it, for there was not enough water, and the out- works were known to be very strong. Moreover, it was supposed that Liu Jung-fu would make a desperate stand here, on the verge of the forest and hill country. the last of any accourt on the Song-coi balow Lao-kai. Further, it was repor ted a month ago that the warlike Governor of Yunnan had come south with six thousand men and was going to check the French invaders. Bat the earthworks had no cannon mounted in them, Liu Jung-fu was away in the bills between, Tuyen-kwan and Thai-nguyen, waiting for the money which China neglects to send him-soli- citons no doubt to pay the indemnity which France demands. The Governor of Yunnat, instead of marching with six thousand men to the defence of Hung-Hoa, would appear to have marched all alone over to the majority, and the six thousand men were no doubt fully employed at his funeral.
But perhaps it would be as well to give some- thing like a connected account of the operations. There was a plan of operations. There was also a plan for the confusion of the Chinamen at Bacninh. Négrier was to do the cutting off there. He was not successful, mainly because it was impossible, certainly impossible when the other forces did not march in nnison. Accordingly Brière do l'Isle was deputed to cut off the retreat this time. He was to march up to Bat-Bac, a village which the perversity of map drawers places half a dozen miles in- land, but which is really hard up against the banks of the Rivière Noire. There he was to cross the river, march by a bill track, and take the Chinamen in the rear. Négrier was to march up to the coufinence of the Rivière Noire with the Fleuve Rouge. There he was to cross and march straight on the town, detaching a battalion of infantry, all the cavalry, and a bat- tery of artillery, which was to cross the Song-coi and seize the north end of the bridge which the.
hinar
tceut
Chinamen had constructed Thug there was to be no route left open for the garrison to retreat by except the road to Lao-kai, and they were to
very severely pounded before de gega juju their escape that way.
General Brière de l'Isle with four thousand mon left Hanoi on the 5th April to march over- land to Sontay and thones to Bat-Bac. General Négrier followed him the next day, and true to his name of Mao-lem, which the soldiers have given him, finished the march to Sontay, which had taken Brière's column the best part of three days, by mid-day on the second. Mão-lem means "hurry up." or "De quick" and is the uniform ory of the soldiers who guard the baggage train. The convoy of each solumn numbers about a thousand coolies and extends orer a matter of a mile in length on Tonquin-roads, so that the refrain becomes sufficiently monotonous. The General cries en avant, the officers ejaculate sorrez, and the baggage guard echoes Mao-lem. That is the supposed train of thought. It is enough, however, without being so logical, to say that Négrier always makes heavy marches, that he hurries from one end of the column (6,000 yards long) to the other, all through the day, and at the end of the march, when every body else is content to rest tranquilly in his billet, goos out prospecting the surrounding country. Well may the French hope for much from his energy and look upon him as the "com- ing general." Coming for what, all the world knows.
Négrier's big march did not, however, conduce to the comfort of the troops. Nobody in Sontay expooted him and there was no room for his troops, so he had to stay outside, and the wretched villagers who had "the Legion" and the plunder- ing baggage coolies settled in their midst, had still more solid reasons for regret. However, next day Brière went off to Bat-Bac and reached there in two days, and on the afternoon of his entry Négrier was joined by the Commander- in-Chief, the Grand Buddha, as the Annamese call him. A march was made up the on- bankment following the river the next day, and the troops cantoned within three miles of the Black River. There they had to wait a day for the heavy guns; the "pieces of 80" and of "95" had been embarked in junks and they all got aground with one accord across the mouth of the Rivière Claire. They were got off and towed up a mile or two and then got aground again and finally the men had to bo dis- embarked and taken overland.
All this took time, and it was in the grey light of a rainy Good Friday morning that the troops arrived at the mouth of the Black River. Brière de l'Isle had extended his line down the right of the river from Bat-Bac so as to keep his touch with the second column. He had done more. Ho had established a battery of "pièces de quatre- ving the day before on a hillock close to the river and had pitched shells into Hung-Hou from a distance of 6,000 yards. This was denounced by every one as premature and as a blunder. But there were more mistakes coming. In the i meantime we were somewhat astonished to find a little post of Chinamen established in a small entrenched barricade right opposite us, There
was a sentinel marching up and down in full view, and every now and then a man would walk i out on to the bank and have a shot at us. The river itself was about 350 yards in width, but there were broad sandbanks on either side, and we were on a high bank. We therefore looked on tran- quilly Presently, however, an unlucky Turco got his left shoulder smashed with a bullet, and then a few volleys of companios were despatched to make the Celestials quit. This they did without either delay or loss. Meanwhile some junks de- signed to make a bridge and conveying ammuni- tion and stores came up the Red River. A huu- dred or so of Annamose and Chinese mixed there- upon came down the left bank of the Song-coi and commenced rifle fire at about 1,300 yards or 50. Finding this ineffectual they got out a gingal, but had only fired three shots, when the Eclair came up and sent them to the right about with some rounds from her Hotch- kiss guns. Meanwhile the big guns were get- ting into position on a little pine-crowned : hillock behind the village of Truong-Ba, where we had halted. Between eight and nine o'clock they commenced their fire. There was a battery ›
pieces of eighty-ordinary European borse artillery and a battery of “siege guns" -- pieces of ninety-five," the regular held artil-
of
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